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Databases as a Service (DaaS) are recently in the spotlight
as an essential component of the cloud computing frame-
work. We can more easily develop applications to facili-
tate users' collaboration than without DaaS. Unfortunately,
DaaS brings a new risk of data compromise because most
data are currently stored and managed by the service provider.
Securing users' information, the data are generally encrypted
at a trusted client. Although encryption ensures that no one
can sneak a look at the data, malicious users still have oppor-
tunities to take users' relational information. The relational
information, which we name social information as opposed
to personal information, has not been adequately examined,
but it is becoming important because of improvement of
social analysis. As described herein, we rst introduce an
attack model of obtaining social information from analyses
of query logs in DaaS; then we provide a solution to the
problem. Our method converts some dierent queries in the
same query, so that malicious attackers cannnot analyze the
query logs. We also dene an overhead cost of the transla-
tion and propose a method that can optimize the conversion
using extensible hashing.
Categories and Subject Descriptors





Privacy, Web Service, DaaS, Social Information
1. INTRODUCTION
Database as a Service (DaaS) is a component of the cloud
computing framework and it is attracting someone's atten-
tion. Nowadays major companies launch DaaS and many
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innovative applications are using it. In the applications,
most of data are stored into servers and managed by ser-
vice providers. Users use them through the web. Therefore
if only they have a connection to the web, they can uti-
lize the applications whenever and wherever they are. Ad-
ditionaly DaaS has another feature: users can share their
data and easily collaborate with all over the world. The
possession enables to develop many new collaborative appli-
cations. However DaaS has a negative property. It brings
down a risk of compromise. The risk from DaaS is more
crucial than one from traditional database systems because
we cannot directly control their data. Actually some cases
such as a server is taken over by attacker and an operator
of a server opens condential by mistake are reported. Pre-
venting the compromise risk and providing safe DaaS are
essential challenge.
To guarantee the safety, there are three kinds of studies
for this purpose; 1) security of data stored in servers; 2)
preventing guess of data from query analysis; 3) protect-
ing personal information of users such as interest or favorite
from query analysis. In the study of security of data, data
are encrypted at trusted clients before sending to the server.
Therefore even server cannot know what data are stored
but the server also cannot process queries. How to pro-
cess queries on the encrypted data is a main topic of this
research. For solving the problem, current encrypted data
have some indices for query processing [5, 4]. Another topic
of the study of security of data stored in servers is how to
share data stored in encrypted database. This topic is how
to share the encryption key between the authorized users.
Damiani et al. introduced a method of dynamically deriving
the encryption keys and reducing the number of keys each
user has to manage [1]. The second group of the studies;
preventing guess of data from query analysis is well known
for the problem of k-anonimity [8]. There are many kinds
of specic problems and solutions for them. There is a de-
mand of requesting data but keeping how data is requested
secret for servers. This demand is called as Private Infor-
mation Retrieval (PIR) [3] and PIR is the third category of
the studies.
In this paper, we add a new problem to the studies. It
is a problem of protecting social information. Social infor-
mation, which we think as opposite idea of personal infor-
mation identifying each person, has not been discussed yet.
However, many researches about social network from web
services are nowadays studied. Discussing security of social
information as privacy issue is therefore becoming signi-
cant. We are not identied by only social information but
organizational size, how organization work, our role in or-
ganizations may be leaked. We would not generally like to
take all association public therefore we must have a right of
deciding public or secret about social information as same
as personal information. Thinking about a scenario of using
DaaS, this service is used by not only individual but also
enterprise. In such case, organization structure is important
condential.
We rstly introduce an attack model of social informa-
tion. For setting the model, we focus attention on query log
and presupposed users who send same and discriminative
queries have high relativity. Secondly, we discuss a method
of query alteration to conceal social information from the at-
tack model. In our proposal approach, some dierent queries
are rewritten to a same query using query transfer tree based
on the extendible hashing [2]. Finally we set a cost function
and use a property of extendible hashing, that is the dis-
tribution of the number of hash value stored in each leaf is
at, to optimize the cost. Our contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows: 1) We raise a new security problem
about social information; 2) We introduce a concrete algo-
rithm of analyzing social information from query logs in the
DaaS scenario; 3) We propose a method of query conversion
to protect social information from query analysis.
2. ATTACK MODEL
Malicious attackers can obtain social information by ana-
lyzing query literals and their frequency. The query literal
is a term in the query such as Nov. 15, 2008 in the fol-
lowing query: date = Nov. 15, 2008. In this chapter, we
model a type of data monitored by attackers and introduce
a method of computing users' similarity from the data.
We consider an application using DaaS. Let U be the set
of users who send requests to the server, and let L be the
set of literals received by the server. An attacker peeping
requests can count how many literal l ∈ L are sent by the
user u ∈ U : the attacker has a logging function of
Log : U × L −→ Z. (1)
We next introduce a method of calculating similarities from
the observed data using a query feature vector for a method
of extracting social information. Analysis of user similarity
using a query feature vector presupposes that users who sent
the same request have a relation. For example, users who
ask an event at a particular date and place have an inter-
est: they have a relation in this meaning. Analyses of user
similarity calculate frequencies for how a user pair sends the
same query and extracts a user pair to which they have high
similarity. The query feature vector of a user is calculated
using the frequency of the literals in requests from that user.
The attacker observes how many users u sent a literal l as
Log(u, l) described above. The user frequency of the literal
l: ufl, which is how many users sent the literal, is calculated





1; if Log(u, l) 6= 0
0; otherwise





Figure 1: Sketch of query conversion.
We dened the query feature vector of user u: QVu. The
feature vector comprises the weights as elements.
In this paper, we dene the similarity of user u and v as




Attackers set a threshold θ and assess a user pair that has a
similarity that is greater than the threshold as related users.
3. QUERY CONVERSION
We start by introducing a sketch of our approach be-
fore describing intimate algorithms related to query con-
version. Figure 1 depicts the basic ow. As an exam-
ple, we consider a schedule management application. On
the application, we attempt to convert the following query:
date = Nov. 15, 2008.
We use a trusted intermediate server for this purpose and
it works according to the following process. It rst converts
the literal Nov. 15, 2008 into a binary string. Where hash
is a hashing function and binary is a function that converts
the input string into a binary string, this step is described
as
binary(hash(Nov. 15, 2008)) = “0110”.
Then, the conversion server translates the binary string us-
ing conversion tree. That is a binary tree; it maps each
binary string to the leaf. The leaf is a binary string that is
mapped is decided from comparing the string to the label
that each edge has. For example, we consider the conversion
tree shown in Fig. 1 and convert binary string “0110”. We
start from the root node (number 1). The rst character
of the target string is 0. Therefore, we choose the upper
edge labeled 0 and go to node number 2. Because the sec-
ond character is 1, we choose the lower edge and go to the
leaf B. Therefore, we decide the leaf mapped by each binary
string. After deciding, we concatenate labels of edges from
the root to the selected leaf. In this example, the connected
label is “01”. Next, we check the length of the connected
label. The wild-card character * is appended to the con-
nected label if the length is shorter than the original binary
string. Consequently, the index literal Nov. 15, 2008 is
converted to “01 ∗ ”. This literal “01 ∗ ” means to require
items started with 01, so that we can bind up many queries
such as those starting with 01. Therefore, attackers cannot
distinguish what the users really want. The query sent to
the server, therefore, is
match(binary(hash(date)), “01 ∗ ”),
Figure 2: Query conversion tree.
Algorithm 1 convert(Tree, user, literal)
path⇐ nil, node⇐ root of Tree
increment Count(user, literal) of Tree
update(Tree)
while node is not leaf node do
for each child of node do
e⇐ label of node to child
if literal[depth of child] = e then





if length(literal) 6= length(path) then
path⇐ path+ “ ∗ ”
end if
return path
where match is the function comparing a binary string and
converted strings. The server can use these functions.
Query conversion converts dierent queries into the same
new query. For that reason, the result of converted queries
might have many irrelevant items. Therefore, the interme-
diate server execute an original query to results so that un-
necessary items are removed, and users and applications can
obtain items as desired.
In the rest of this chapter, we rstly dene the conversion
tree and then we explain our algorithm of the conversion.
3.1 Structure of Conversion Tree
Our conversion tree T is based on extensible hash and Fig.
2 presents a sample of it. We formally dene it as
T (root, V, L,Counter).
Therein, V is a set of nodes and root ∈ V is the root node of
tree T . Our tree has nodes of two kinds: inner nodes and leaf
nodes. The inner node (shown as a circle in Fig. 2) has a set
of child nodes. The leaf node (shown as a box in Fig. 2) has
a set of literals mapped to the leaf node. Edges connecting a
node to another node have a label, where L is a set of literals
converted this tree and Counter is a counter that counts the
requests of every user. We use numbers recorded by the
counter as a function. Therefore, let Count(u, l) represent
the number of users u ∈ U who request literal l ∈ L.
3.2 Query Conversion Algorithm
When the conversion server receives a query: attr = l, it
translates the literal l in the query into the binary string b:
b = binary(hash(l)), where hash is a hashing function and
binary is a function converting an input to the binary string.
The conversion server processes the binary string by steps
shown in Algorithm 1. First, the counter of a requesting
user u and the literal l (Counter(u, l)) is incremented by one,
Figure 3: Restricting query conversion tree.
and the conversion tree is updated. This updating process is
explained in the next chapter. Then, a leaf node mapped by
the binary string b is computed by pursuing the conversion
tree. After deciding the mapped leaf, labels set in the edges
from the root node to the leaf node are connected. A wild-
card character * is appended to the connected labels if the
length of the connected labels does not equal the length of
the binary string. Finally, we obtain the connected labels
as a converted string b′. The request sent to the server uses
functions binary, hash, and match; it is written as follows
match(binary(hash(attr)), b′).
If a user's request has more than two literals, for example re-
questing from a date and a place, we use as many conversion
trees as the literals contained in the request.
3.3 Update of Conversion Tree
Our proposed approach binds some queries and converts
another query. Consequently, we prevent attackers from
inferring the social information from observed query logs.
However, binding some queries causes users to obtain items
they did not ask for, which means that the cost increases.
We restrict the conversion tree dynamically to keep the cost
under a given maximum cost.
The conversion tree is updated when a user converts a
query. We imagine that a user sends a query and that the
query is mapped to a leaf node n; and we let the depth
of node n be d. In this condition, the literals Ls in the
leaf node n are rst divided into two subsets Ls0 and Ls1,
literals for which the d-th character is 0 and 1 respectively
belong to Ls0 and Ls1. Then, Ls0 and Ls1 are examined as
to whether they should be divided or not. The tree removes
the leaf nodes n and adds two leaf nodes n0 and n1, which
respectively have the set of literals Ls0 and Ls1 if the subsets
are divided by the judgment. Figure 3 portrays this update
process. The old leaf node n containing the set of literals
Ls is changed to an inner node to connect new leaf nodes;
also, new leaf nodes n0 and n1 are added and connected to
the inner node. The new edges from the inner node to n0
and n1 respectively bear labels 0 and 1.
Determination of the divide is done according to the fol-
lowing steps considering costs. The costs cost0 and cost1 are







(i = 0, 1).
The leaf node n are divided into the two leaf nodes n0 and n1
if at least one of the costs cost0 and cost1 are bigger than
a given max allowable cost c. The following conditions are
computed for each subset if the costs are less than the c.∑
l∈Lsi
∣∣∣∣Count(u, l)totalu − Count(v, l)totalv
∣∣∣∣ < k (∀u, v ∈ U, i = 0, 1)
When the condition presented above is true for L0 and L1,
then the leaf nodes n are divided into the two leaf nodes
n0 and n1. The condition means a summation for every
literal of a dierence of rates for how many users u and v
sent a literal l. That it is so small is an expression of a
dierence of rates; the number of users u and v who sent
literals mapped in the nodes n0 and n1 is small, which is a
dierent tendency from that by which requests observed by
attackers are small. Consequently, nodes are divided if the
intractability of analyzing similarity can remain high, even
if the cost is not great.
For this determination, a conversion server must record
the number of items Nl matching a request l. The server
therefore must examine insert and delete events for the databases.
4. EVALUATION EXPERIMENT
4.1 Dataset used for Experiments
We have an experiment to evaluate our proposal. For
this experiment, we need a dataset that has users belonging
to some groups and queries by the users to DaaS. Unfor-
tunately, such public datasets are apparently unavailable.
Therefore we choose an open dataset which is used by Alexan-
der et al. for evaluating query processing on a P2P net-
work [6]. This dataset is based on the OpenDirectory [7].
OpenDirectory is a project for classifying web sites; it has
hierarchical categories. Each category has more segmental-
ized categories and web sites which are categorized in the
category. Each web site might belong to more than two cat-
egories. Meaning that the editor of a web site belongs to
some category group. In our experiment, we use web sites
in OpenDirectory as users and categories as groups as same
as the experiment by Alexander et al. That is the dataset
is reect a real community: people might belong to some
interest group.
In this experiment, we use categories for which the depth
is less than ve and use web sites belonging to the categories.
Then we create 100,000 queries on the users and groups.
Our conguration is that each user must request web sites
belonging to a group similarly to a user who would use the
web site. The number of queries depends on the Zipf distri-
bution, which is often used in studies of social networks [9].
We calculate the similarity over the converted queries for
the dataset; the dataset has 133,602 users and 6,280 groups.
4.2 Result
Next, we explain the results. We use the precision and
recall for measurement of success of attacks. The lower pre-
cision and recall therefore indicate higher safety. The x-axes
of cost graphs show cost; the y-axes show the numbers of
users. They therefore express that 100 users have 5 cost
points if a point stands for (5, 100). The cost value of user






where Nl be the number of items received from the server
as a result of a request literal l. That is the formulation
expresses an average of the number of items user u receive
from the server.
Fig. 4 portrays the capability of our attack model, which


























































(b) k = 1.0
Figure 5: Reception cost of data for each users.
decide that users belong to the same group if the similar-
ity is greater than threshold θ. Consequently, our attack
method indicates high precision for any threshold. On the
other hand, recall is about 0.5, indicating the need for some
improvement.
Fig. 5 and 6 depicts the result about our approach. Fig.
5 shows the distribution of the costs; each user can execute
queries under the maximum admissible cost for all cases.
The value c in the graphs of Fig. 6 is the maximum ad-
missible cost described in section 3.3. Speaking from the
graphs, the condition c = 50, k = 1.0 conducts the safest
result. Each user in this case downloads, at most, 50 items
a query; the average of the precisions is less than 0.6. The
average of the recalls in this case is about 0.5.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As described herein, we introduce a new privacy problem
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(d) Recall (k = 1.0)
Figure 6: Result of similarity using query conversion.
that which services already provide. Social information is
information about relation between users: it diers from
personal information because personal information is infor-
mation identifying individual users. Therefore, it has been
treated as unimportant. Nevertheless, many methods of an-
alyzing social networks are studied so that the relation in-
formation can present risk. We believe that discussing social
information is important to retain privacy.
Based on these situations, we introduce an attack method
of exposing social information from analyzing queries. We
propose a method to defend the attack by rewriting the
queries. Our proposal has two parameters related to safety
and cost; users can choose them according to their demand.
Moreover, we evaluate our proposal using an experiment
based on real information: an open directory. Based on the
result, a specic pair of parameters yields high security and
low overhead. However, our method must incur large costs
depending on circumstances: more improvement is neces-
sary.
We envision our future work as improvement of the at-
tack method and query conversion to protect privacy from
stronger attacks.
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